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ABSTRACT: This paper primarily addresses Barry Dainton and Tim Bayne’s article, “Consciousness as a Guide to
Personal Persistence.” In this article, Dainton and Bayne reject psychological continuity in favor of phenomenal
continuity as a criterion for personal persistence. They define phenomenal continuity as the kind of connection between
a person’s experiences that obtains when those experiences are components of a unified stream of consciousness. I
summarize Dainton and Bayne’s position and defend them in bringing attention to phenomenal continuity as an
important factor in personal persistence. However, I argue that they go too far in holding that complete loss of
psychological continuity is survivable. I make a distinction between an individual’s self and person, arguing that
phenomenal continuity is a sufficient condition for the persistence of a person but not that person’s self — only
psychological continuity can enable a self to persist through time. Since it is our selves that we should really be
concerned about, we should not be willing to settle solely for continuity among our experiences. Still, while phenomenal
continuity isn’t a sufficient condition for the persistence of a self-conscious entity, it is a necessary one, and so in the
end I construe the concept of phenomenal continuity as an important addition to Lockean accounts of personal
persistence.
Republication not permitted without written consent of the author.

Published by STARS, 2007

www.URJ.ucf.edu

37

1

The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ), Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 5
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

3: 37-46

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

In their paper, “Consciousness as a Guide to Personal
Persistence,” Barry Dainton and Tim Bayne explicate a
Lockean account of personal identity, in that it is framed
in terms of mental states and capacities. However, it
diverges from more mainstream accounts by concentrating
on phenomenal continuity, as opposed to psychological
continuity of the type described by Locke (241) or more
recently Parfit (206), as a criterion for the persistence
of personal identity over time (Dainton and Bayne
549).1 Phenomenal continuity refers to a relationship
between experiences; that is, when experiences are
members of unified streams of consciousness of the
kind we usually enjoy, they are related by phenomenal
continuity (Dainton and Bayne 549). Dainton and
Bayne view this shift of perspective as obligatory for
Lockeans, mostly because it dispels challenges posed to
Lockean methodology by certain thought experiments,
particularly a longstanding dilemma described by
Bernard Williams, discussed below (549). I seek to prove
in this paper that Dainton and Bayne’s analysis is correct
to the extent that phenomenal continuity is indeed an
indispensable concept in accounting for the persistence
of a person over time. However, their first and second
theses — which, taken together, hold that phenomenal
continuity is sufficient to preserve a person over time and
that the loss of psychological continuity can be survived
(559) — require adjustment to yield more consistently
compelling and intuitive conclusions regarding certain
imaginary cases. I submit that persisting, self-conscious
entities (such as the average human being) should be
understood as constituted by a person and a self. To
introduce this idea very briefly here, I define the person
as the subject who experiences the contents of a stream
of consciousness; the person persists as long as the entity
senses a relationship of temporal continuity between his/
her successive phenomenal contents. In contrast, I define
the self (roughly) as the psychology of the person. I
amend Dainton and Bayne’s second thesis in light of this
distinction to make it more consistent with our intuitions
regarding our persistence conditions.
In “The Self and the Future,” Bernard Williams poses
three imaginary cases that are only slightly dissimilar from
one another. The first involves a situation that could be
construed as a body-switch: two human beings (hereafter
referred to as “subjects”), A and B, are hooked up to a
brain-state transfer device which imprints A’s body with
information from B’s brain and vice versa (161). Prior to
the brain-state transfer, A and B are told that one of the
two entities that results from the procedure will be given
a large sum of money and the other will be tortured;
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol3/iss1/5

A and B must choose (prior to the procedure) which
resultant subject — the A-body-subject or the B-bodysubject — receives which treatment. Suppose A privately
tells the experimenter that he chooses the B-bodysubject to get the money and B requests the opposite
circumstances. The switch is then thrown and the brain
states are transferred. The experimenter, realizing he
cannot fulfill both requests, arbitrarily accords with B’s
wishes, giving the money to the A-body-subject and
torturing the B-body-subject. Williams depicts the
reactions of each ensuing subject: the B-body-subject
(since he has A’s memories) complains that he did not
choose this outcome and also that he chose in the way
he did precisely because he did not want the unpleasant
things to happen to him. Meanwhile, the A-body-person
will be gratified that he received the money and will be
vindicated that he chose wisely. Williams writes:
These facts make a strong case for
saying that the experimenter has
brought it about that B did in the
outcome get what he wanted and A
did not. It is therefore a strong case
for saying that the B-body-person
really is A, and the A-body-person
really is B; and therefore for saying
that the process of the experiment
really is that of changing bodies. . . .
This seems to show that to care about
what happens to me in the future is
not necessarily to care about what
happens to this body. (164)

Following this line of reasoning, Williams holds that this
scenario demonstrates that one should identify oneself
with one’s memories (167).
The second imaginary case is similar, but designed to pull
the reader’s intuitions in the opposite direction, towards
the idea that “[one’s] undergoing physical pain in the
future is not excluded by any psychological state [one]
may be in at the time” (169) and thus towards a more
bodily criterion for personal survival.2 To this effect, the
second case includes only A and the experimenter.3 The
experimenter tells A, always using the second-person
pronoun, that A will be tortured after having impressions
of a past, which exactly fits the past of another currently
living person, installed into his brain (167, 168). In this
case (in contrast to the first, above) A becomes fearful.
Why would he fear the torture of his body in this case but
not the previous one? Consider the two key differences
between Williams’s first and second cases. First, the
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A continues to exist after the procedure, psychologically
altered but still capable of experiencing pain. To this
effect, Williams portrays A’s inner monologue thusly:
I can at least conceive the possibility,
if not the concrete reality, of going
completely mad, and thinking
perhaps that I am George IV or
somebody; and being told that
something like that was going
to happen to me would have no
tendency to reduce the terror of
being told authoritatively that I was
going to be tortured. (168)

Interpreting the procedure as a brainwashing seems very
tenable and renders it at least plausible that A ought to
exhibit self-concern for the one who will be tortured.
Unlike the first case (in which the B-body-person
came to bear A’s memories), the A-body-person has no
competitor (impostor?) seeking to claim the name of “A”
for him/herself.
While on the subject of determining which labels to
assign to entities, it is worth mentioning that the second
difference between Williams’s two cases is that the
experimenter uses only the second-person pronoun in
the second case; that is, A is told “the torture will happen
to you.” This choice of pronoun makes it difficult not to
sympathize with A’s self-concern for the resultant person
who will be tortured. Williams contends that it is not
obvious whether the experimenter misrepresents the
situation in speaking that way.
Williams’s third imaginary case further frustrates an
attempt to use any sort of memory criterion to define
the persistence of a person. The third “case” is composed
of six different scenarios, each involving a psychological
alteration being performed on A, followed by the A-bodyperson’s torture. The psychological alterations depicted in
the scenarios proceed piecemeal from the commonplace
(amnesia) to the outcome described in Williams’s first
imaginary case (in which A’s and B’s mental information
are reciprocally exchanged). More specifically, Williams
depicts a first scenario in which A is tortured after an
operation that causes total amnesia, a second scenario
in which this torture is preceded by amnesia and the
inducement of certain changes in A’s character, a third
that is the same as the second except that illusory memory
beliefs are also induced in A, a fourth in which these
memories are modeled after another actual person (B),
a fifth in which the result of the fourth is accomplished
Published by STARS, 2007

by putting the information into A directly from the
brain of B (leaving B the same as before), and a sixth
that is essentially the same as Williams’s first imaginary
case — A’s and B’s mental information are reciprocally
exchanged (172). Clearly, the difference between each
successive psychological alteration depicted in the
above situations is only slight and incremental (perhaps
even merely superficial), leading to the idea that the
differences among the scenarios are differences of degree
and not of kind. Williams believes that A would have
straightforward reasons for fearing the pain of torture if
he foreknew that his prospect would be that of situation
number one (inducement of amnesia followed by torture).
Williams is confident that most would agree with this
belief (as am I). Given that A has reasons for fearing
the pain of torture in the first situation, and given that
each situation features various psychological alterations
that differ only incrementally and by degrees from one
another, Williams argues that A has reasons for fearing
torture if he foreknew that his prospect were any of the
above situations. He seeks to show that it is at least
plausible that there are cases in which “one’s fears can
extend to future pain whatever psychological changes
precede it” (180). Still, this arguably tacit endorsement
of a more-or-less bodily criterion for the survival of
persons is reluctant and unsure (180).4 So in the end,
Williams’s paper forces ambivalence on the reader, since
his imaginary experiments are ambiguous with respect to
whether A has survived (176, 180). When, upon reading
any of his three imaginary cases, readers intuitively favor
one interpretation (e.g., that A has survived a procedure
or not), Williams implicitly makes the point that this
confidence is a result of how the facts are presented
(such as when his first case was neatly arranged to favor
an “entities switching bodies” interpretation) and less a
result of the facts themselves (Dainton and Bayne 550).
As Dainton and Bayne write, “Given an appropriate
narrative context, the stipulation that a brain-state
transfer device shifts a person from one body to another
can seem as natural and plausible as the stipulation that it
merely affects a drastic form of brainwashing on a subject
who remains in their original body” (552).
Williams’s inducement of a lack of faith in imaginary
cases when they are used as tools in philosophical
argumentation amounts to a critical blow to Lockean
accounts of personal identity because, as Dainton and
Bayne point out, Lockeans generally rely on imaginary
cases to justify their arguments (549). In what sense do
Lockeans depend on imaginary cases? Lockean accounts
of personal identity are characterized by the fact that
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Self depends on consciousness, not on
substance. Self is that conscious thinking
thing, — whatever substance made up of,
(whether spiritual or material, simple or
compounded, it matters not) — which
is sensible or conscious of pleasure and
pain, capable of happiness and misery,
and so is concerned for itself, as far as
that consciousness extends. . . . [U]pon
separation of [one’s] little finger, should
[one’s] consciousness go along with the
little finger, and leave the rest of the
body, it is evident the little finger would
be the person, the same person; and self
then would have nothing to do with the
rest of the body. (245)
In questions of personal persistence, Locke uses memory
as the decisive factor: “Absolute oblivion separates what
is thus forgotten from the person, but not from the man”
(246). (By “person,” Locke means “a forensic term” which
“is the name for this self ” [249].)
So far as we know, consciousness and bodies are
inseparable in practice. As a result, it does not matter
in practice whether one determines personal persistence
in terms of diachronic bodily continuity or diachronic
psychological continuity. This irrelevance means that
in order to justify and illustrate his points, Locke (and
for that matter, modern-day philosophers sympathetic
to his approach) uses imaginary cases in which the two
continuities (that is, diachronic bodily and psychological
continuity) diverge. For example, Locke relies on posing
situations like the following:
Could we suppose two distinct
incommunicable consciousnesses acting
in the same body, the one constantly by
day, the other by night, and, on the other
side, the same consciousness, acting
by intervals, two distinct bodies: I ask,
in the first case, whether the day and
night-man would not be two as distinct
persons as Socrates and Plato? And
whether, in the second case, there would
not be one person in two distinct bodies,
as much as one man is the same in two
distinct clothings? (248)

Lockeans’ recourse to hypothetical scenarios like those
above is what philosophers have in mind when they
write that Lockean accounts of personal identity rely
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol3/iss1/5

on imaginary cases to justify their arguments; Lockeans’
reliance on this rhetorical technique is what leads Dainton
and Bayne to note that effective attacks against the use
of imaginary cases as tools for justifying arguments serve
as effective attacks against Lockean accounts of personal
identity in general.
So how do Dainton and Bayne discharge the threat and
make sense of Williams’s argument? They argue that
Williams’s scenarios are only able to induce contradictory
responses in the reader because no mention is made of
phenomenal continuity in any scenario (550). They hold
that, when a distinction is made between phenomenal and
psychological continuity, no ambiguity can exist (550).
What is phenomenal continuity? The “base ingredients”
are not dispositional states, as in psychological continuity;5
rather, they are phenomenal states (i.e., experiences).
Phenomenal states are unified, in both the synchronic
and diachronic case, by phenomenal connectedness (553).
Synchronic phenomenal connectedness is manifested in
the “togetherness” or “unity-within-consciousness” of our
experience of the various contents of an average conscious
state, such as current conscious thoughts, bodily sensations,
perceptions, etc. (553, 554). Phenomenal connectedness also
holds diachronically in that “each brief phase of a stream
of consciousness is experienced as flowing into the next”
(554).6 Furthermore, experiences at different times which
are not phenomenally connected can be phenomenally
continuous if they are linked by an overlapping chain of
direct phenomenal connections (554), which introduces
transitivity to the relation of phenomenal connectedness.
This distinction between phenomenal connectedness and
phenomenal continuity mirrors the distinction Parfit makes
between psychological continuity and connectedness (Parfit
206) that effectively addresses the kind of transitivity
objection Reid aims at Locke’s theory of identity (Reid 248,
249). 7 Dainton and Bayne hold that phenomenal continuity
is different from psychological continuity, however, in that
psychological continuity is a causal relationship, whereas
phenomenal continuity is an experiential one (549). They
acknowledge some room for argument on this particular
point (though they personally find implausible the type
of reductive analysis necessary to make such an argument
against their position [555]), but they contend that those
favoring an opposing argument must at least acknowledge
that phenomenal and psychological continuity are distinct
since the former cannot be reductively analyzed in terms of
beliefs or memories (554). Dainton and Bayne’s explication of
their concept of phenomenal continuity sets up their answer
to Williams: they say that the outcomes of his imaginary
cases depend on whether phenomenal continuity
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is preserved for A and B throughout any of the memoryswapping/brainwashing procedures that Wiliams
portrays, then A and B follow their flow of experience
(559), regardless of any changes in their psychology. As
Dainton and Bayne write,
Williams’s scenarios should be baffling; we
are unsure what to make of them because
we are left in the dark about what really
matters from the point of view of one’s
continued existence. The readers fill in the
details about phenomenal continuity for
themselves, and the narrative structure of
[Williams’s scenarios] leads them to fill
in the relevant details in different ways
[for each scenario]. But . . . clarifying the
fate of a subject’s stream of consciousness
also removes any doubt about the fate of
the subject themselves: they invariably
follow the flow of experience. (559)

Thus, they resolve Williams’s puzzle, something
which they contend that neither physical nor standard
psychological accounts of personal identity can do
(570).
In their paper, Dainton and Bayne make three particularly
important claims that I will reproduce mostly verbatim
below, in the interest of brevity, and because I will be
referring to them in the subsequent argument:
The Inseparability Thesis: self and
phenomenal continuity cannot come
apart; all the experiences in a single (nonbranching) stream of consciousness are
co-personal. (557) (T1) [Phenomenal
continuity, either by itself or combined
with psychological continuity] is personpreserving, even across changes in brain
and body. (559) (T2) Loss of psychological
continuity is survivable. (559)
I take issue with T1 and T2. When they are applied to
certain imaginary cases in an effort to determine whether
a person has survived some procedure, they can yield very
counterintuitive results that are not at all compelling.
Before posing such a case, it is necessary to go through
some details of Dainton and Bayne’s paper in order to
defend some inferences I will draw. To this end, consider
that phenomenal continuity is sustained by a stream of
consciousness. Dainton and Bayne ask, “How simple can
a stream of consciousness get before it leaves its owner
Published by STARS, 2007

behind? How primitive can the contents of a stream become
before it ceases to support one of us?” (560). One can imagine
a situation — meditative trance, for example — in which
one’s stream of consciousness excludes all the sensations
with which we are familiar except an awareness of one’s
breathing. Extreme cases like this suggest that the contents
of a stream of consciousness must meet some minimum
level of sophistication in order to constitute a stream of
consciousness in the first place. Dainton and Bayne suggest
placing this minimum at a low threshold, proposing that we
could survive on a very rudimentary consciousness, perhaps
like that which people have in the womb, with no cognitive
sophistication at all (560, 561). (While Dainton and Bayne
acknowledge some room for debate here regarding whether
we experience rudimentary consciousness of this sort prior
to birth, I agree that one’s phenomenal continuity, at least,
is sustained by such a simple kind of consciousness in the
womb.8 As they say, why shouldn’t a person persist as long
as his/her stream of consciousness flows on, regardless of
how primitive its character becomes? [561])9 I hold that
at least this minimally sophisticated type of content must
exist in all persons’ streams of consciousness. This line
of reasoning follows from Dainton and Bayne’s above
conclusions: the one thing all people have in common is
their personhood, and the minimally sufficient criterion for
the persistence of personhood is the continuing presence
of the type of minimally sophisticated content described
above. In other words, to qualify as a person in the first
place, one must experience a stream of consciousness that
is at least at the minimum level of sophistication. Any more
sophisticated type of content enjoyed by a person’s stream of
consciousness must exist in addition to this minimum type
of consciousness. This notion — that all people’s streams of
consciousness have some minimally sophisticated content
in common — is in keeping with any sensible notion of
what an increase in the sophistication of consciousness must
entail; for example, if a basic bodily feeling (say, awareness
of the passage of time) is present at the minimal level of
sophistication of conscious experience, how is one to conceive
that this faculty could be absent at a more sophisticated level
of conscious experience? Whatever people can experience
at consciousness’s lowest threshold of primitiveness must
be indispensable to personhood and therefore exist (at least
tacitly) in all people.
Now that it is understood that all people’s streams of
consciousness share a certain content in common, I will
pose a thought experiment somewhat similar to one of
Dainton and Bayne’s, in which a person’s phenomenal and
psychological continuities come apart, via the use of a
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streamal diverter (which diverts a person's stram of
consciousness instantaneiously from one brain to another,
but does not transfer any of his/her psychology [556]).
This experiment follows: I -- Call me Pat -- will have my
stream of consciousness instantly diverted such that it
becomes sustained by another’s body. (In other words, I
will come to experience events as they are rendered by this
other person’s nervous system.) The other person’s stream
of consciousness will not undergo any such transfer, and
so will be annihilated during the procedure. Remember,
my psychology will not make the transfer since a brainstate transfer device is not being used in tandem with
the streamal diverter; as a result, none of my memories,
beliefs, desires, and other psychological states will survive.
The person whose brain my stream of consciousness will
be diverted into has no cognitive sophistication at all, and
his/her brain can support only a stream of consciousness
of the minimum sophistication required for him/her to
be considered a person in the first place. This other person
can be imagined to be a fetus in the womb if the reader
subscribes to the notion, as Dainton and Bayne seem to
(561), that such a creature is in fact a person; if not, the
reader can substitute whatever he/she considers to be the
most rudimentary form of person imaginable.
What would actually happen in such a procedure?
According to Dainton and Bayne, I would survive,
since their first and second theses (T1 and T2) assert
that phenomenal continuity is all that is required to
preserve a person and the loss of psychological continuity
can be survived (559). But is this really a sufficiently
accurate description of what occurs in the procedure?
I do not think so. Consider what actually happens —
everything that has ever characterized my existence as
a unique human (my psychology) is annihilated. So
what is left? Only that minimally sophisticated stream
of consciousness, that bare aspect of personhood which
is common to all people everywhere. To say, because of
this minimum degree of personal persistence, that “I”
survived the procedure is to equate my self entirely and
solely with the single, bare quality of personhood itself,
and nothing else — no further unique characteristics.
Following the procedure, I am only that which all people
sustain in themselves — the bare capacity for awareness.
I find it extremely counterintuitive to describe me simply
as “surviving” in this transformation. Such an account
of the events is not descriptive enough. This procedure
kills the “Pat” in me — every quality I had ascribed to
myself as Pat ceases to characterize me anymore. My
memories as Pat are irretrievably lost. If the entity into
which my stream of consciousness is diverted is a fetus,
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol3/iss1/5

this fetus will eventually grow more cognitive capacity
and the contents of my stream of consciousness will be
characterized by increasing sophistication according
to the fetus’s development of memories, personality
characteristics, and other dispositional states. But this
new psychology will be completely different from
that which I had previously possessed. In light of this
complete psychological reformatting, I would see no
reason to identify my current self with this ensuing
entity; in fact, if I were told that the ensuing individual
were going to be, say, tortured, I would not be any more
concerned than if I were told the same of any random
stranger.10
It seems to me that Dainton and Bayne, in order to
allow for a more thorough, accurate, and intuitive
account of the above thought experiment, should
amend their argument slightly. I submit that persisting,
self-conscious entities (such as the average human
being) should be understood as necessarily composed
of two parts, a self and a person. I define the person
as the subject who experiences the contents of a
stream of consciousness. (The person persists as long
as phenomenal continuity obtains in his/her case.) I
define the self as all the cognitive processes that are
potentially realizable (in the brain) and that stand
consistently ready to be triggered in specific types of
situations so as to impinge upon the person’s stream
of consciousness in (more or less) dependable, regular
ways. (However, I intend this definition to exclude
potentially realizable cognitive processes that are
standing available to impinge upon consciousness
solely because of the spatiotemporal orientation of
the person’s body with respect to its surroundings.
For example, if you stare at a painting in a museum,
the cognitive process by which the painting can be
depended on to remain in the visual field should not
count as a constituent of your self, because such a
process is available to impinge upon consciousness in a
dependable way solely because of the orientation of your
body in its environment. In other words, potentially
realizable cognitive processes that are standing available
to impinge upon consciousness solely as a result of the
immediate operation of the physiological methods of
perception, such as sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch,
equilibrioception, thermoception, proprioception,
nociception, etc., are not constituents of the self.)
An example of such a cognitive process that stands
ready to be triggered in the right sort of situations can
be illustrated by the following scenario. Consider a
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pedestrian and an experienced skateboarder traversing
a particular stretch of sidewalk riddled with cracks.
Looking down, both are confronted with the same
visual field.
However, the skateboarder (perhaps
unconsciously) distinguishes more features in the scene
than the pedestrian does since the skateboarder must
quickly classify the various cracks according to which are
passable and which are impassable with respect to the
diameter of the skateboard’s wheels. This discriminatory
ability and its tendency to be engaged (consciously or
not) in the right sorts of situations (such as when the
skateboarder is traversing uneven surfaces) should count
as a constituent of the skateboarder’s self. Another
example of a constituent of a self might be a particular
memory, insofar as the memory is rendered by a cognitive
process and can be depended on to be accessible in
the right sorts of situations (such as when a person
consciously tries to recall it). Personality traits (if they are
defined as dispositions to act a particular way in a given
situation) are a third example, since they seem reducible,
again, to potentially realizable cognitive processes that
stand consistently ready to be triggered in specific types
of situations.
All these constituents of the self might be considered
objective in the sense that they exist (for the most part)
whether or not the person acknowledges them. For
example, one can only be so successful in consciously
repressing memories — a particular memory can
remain available to present itself in conscious awareness
whether or not one chooses to recall it. By virtue of their
objective existence, these constituents of the self might
be contrasted with the person’s narrative self (as defined
by Dennett) which is subjective in the sense that the
narrative self is the result of an act of free interpretation
of the objective self and is amenable to almost complete
revision at any time. In the account being developed here,
the person weaves together all the constituents of his/her
objective self (memories, tendencies, capacities, etc.) into
a subjective whole, the narrative self, in order to construct
a life story which makes sense of his/her existence for
him/herself and others.
The continuous availability of all of these (objectively
existent) cognitive processes for contributing to a selfnarrative and impinging upon consciousness (and the
fact that a person can depend on their activation in
critical circumstances, such that the skateboarder can
approach sidewalk cracks with confidence) afford the
person a sense of continuity above and beyond mere
Published by STARS, 2007

phenomenal continuity. It seems to me undeniable that
the preservation of this further continuity — I’ll label it
“psychological continuity” because it seems analogous to
that familiar term — is a large part of what self-conscious
entities (such as the average human being) have in mind
when they express their desire to persist over time.
Having concluded my redefinitions of “self ” and
“person,” I submit that survival admits of degrees — full
survival requires the preservation of both the person
and the constituents of the self, but preservation of only
the person constitutes partial survival (as in the above
thought experiment with the fetus) and is preferable to
death. (I think that most human beings would prefer
amnesia to death, for example.)
This distinction between person and self increases the
descriptive power of Dainton and Bayne’s phenomenalist
account while maintaining all of the progress their
position has already made in disambiguating the
aforementioned threatening imaginary cases. For
instance, my definitions, like Dainton and Bayne’s,
allow for the argument that Williams’s scenarios induce
contradictory responses in the reader only because no
mention is made of whether phenomenal continuity is
preserved in any of the cases. In fact, it seems that my
account disambiguates the outcome of each scenario
more than Dainton and Bayne’s does. For instance, if
we were to assume in Williams’s first scenario that the
subjects were conscious throughout the brain-state
transfer, then, by my account, each subject undergoes
a partial death: the persons would persist through the
brain-state transfer but each person’s old self would “die”
as a new one replaced it. Such an account does justice
to the fear many people would likely experience at the
prospect of undergoing such a procedure. In contrast,
Dainton and Bayne’s account would simply stipulate
that each subject survives because their person survives,
even though their self does not.
Despite such differences, my distinction does not radically
alter Dainton and Bayne’s conclusions. As described
below, most of their theses remain true following my
redefinition of terms, although some are made to mean
something slightly different. Still, where their meanings
are altered it seems that Dainton and Bayne’s theses are
brought into line with a more reasonable concept of
what it means to survive.
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For example, the first clause of the Inseparability Thesis
would remain true according to my interpretation of
terms: self and phenomenal continuity still cannot come
apart, for if one’s stream of consciousness ceased to flow,
then his/her person would die, since the minimally
sufficient condition that must be maintained for a
person’s persistence (as reasoned above) is that he/she
be a conscious being.11 It follows that in the absence
of his/her person, his/her self cannot exist, since any
self is defined in terms of the availability of streamal
content (that is, content of a stream of consciousness) to
a person. If the person ceases to exist, the constituents of
the self are unavailable to anyone, and therefore cease to
constitute a self.12
The second clause of the Inseparability Thesis is similarly
unthreatened: The notion that all the experiences in a
single (non-branching) stream of consciousness are copersonal is entirely consistent with my definition of a
person.
T1 is also left intact. Phenomenal continuity holds
whenever a given temporal “snapshot” of the contents of
a stream of consciousness is experienced as flowing into
the next temporal snapshot, and so on. It must therefore
be true that a stream of consciousness must exist in
any instance in which phenomenal continuity holds.
The continued existence of a stream of consciousness
obviously necessitates a subject of consciousness, which
by my definition is a person. Therefore, it remains true
that phenomenal continuity, either by itself or combined
with psychological continuity, is person-preserving. And
if phenomenal continuity can be maintained across
changes of brain and body, then so can the existence of a
person as I have defined it.
It turns out that the foremost effect that my distinction
between selves and persons has on Dainton and Bayne’s
argument is that it requires that T2 be clarified. T2
reads, “Loss of psychological continuity is survivable”
(559). Recall that I define a persisting, self-conscious
entity as composed of a self and a person, in which the
self is the person’s psychology, so a loss of psychological
continuity implies the death of the self and is therefore
not compatible with the notion of full survival. With
this definition in mind, I propose that T2 be amended
to “loss of psychological continuity is survivable by one’s
person, but not one’s self.”13 This amended version of T2
echoes the point made above, that persistence admits of
degrees. Full survival requires the preservation of both
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol3/iss1/5

the person and self, but preservation of only the person
constitutes partial survival.
My amended readings of Dainton and Bayne’s theses
provide a much more descriptive and intuitive account
of the imaginary fetal “streamal diverter” case I depicted
above. According to the amended framework of analysis,
that experiment results in the following events coming to
pass: the fetus’s person dies, taking the fetus’s self with it;
my self dies when my old psychology becomes unavailable
to any person, but my person survives in the body of
the fetus and eventually sustains a new self as the fetus
matures and accumulates experiences. Is this not a more
descriptive, realistic account than that which Dainton and
Bayne would have to offer, saying simply that the fetus
dies and I live?
In closing, Dainton and Bayne, in explicating the
concept of phenomenal continuity, have provided a tool
which seems indispensable in constructing a truly robust
Lockean theory of personal identity. They are correct
in saying that adjusting the primacy of psychological
continuity downward in favor of phenomenal continuity
when considering questions of personal persistence is
obligatory for Lockeans — imaginary cases such as
Bernard Williams’s scenarios are otherwise intractable.14
Nevertheless, they are too quick to dismiss the importance
of psychological continuity. After all, most people care
strongly about what happens to them. What exactly is it
that a person cares about when he/she cares about him/
herself? I (and probably most others) understand the
concept of “self ” to refer to those qualities that make a
person distinct from others. For example, what does it
mean to be, say, an individual by the name of Pat? It means
remembering a litany of events from Pat’s perspective,
having Pat’s set of attitudes and opinions regarding a
range of topics; it means having Pat’s particular set of goals
and intentions; it means caring intimately about what
happens to Pat. The fact that one’s attachment to one’s self
consists largely in a desire to maintain the characteristics
that make one unique is why phenomenal continuity is an
insufficient (albeit necessary) condition for the survival of a
self; because, in its most rudimentary form (as in the above
fetal example) the maintenance merely of phenomenal
continuity does not guarantee that what makes a person
distinct from others — the person’s psychology — is kept
intact. Surely, we must identify our selves as more than
merely minimally sophisticated streams of consciousness
devoid of psychological content if we are to construct a
theory of the persistence of beings over time that does
justice to
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our intuitions in every situation, however
hypothetical or physically impossible such
situations may be.
NOTES
1 While I write that Locke accounts for personal
persistence in terms of psychological continuity,
he might more technically be said to endorse a
psychological connectedness criterion for the
persistence of personal identity over time since his
notion of the identity relation does not allow for
transitivity (as Reid points out [248, 249]).
2 When Williams writes that “[one’s] undergoing
physical pain in the future is not excluded by any
psychological state [one] may be in at the time” (169),
he notes the exception of certain psychological states,
such as unconsciousness, which preclude the experience
of pain (169).
3 Actually, Williams does not frame the second
case in terms of A and the experimenter; instead, he
uses the first-person perspective. For example, he writes
“Someone in whose power I am tells me that I am
going to be tortured tomorrow” (167). Since this is the
only one of Williams’s cases thus depicted, I describe it
in the third-person for the sake of comparison.
4 That is, Williams waters down his conclusion
by preceding it with the word “perhaps” (180) and
acknowledging that he risks being incorrect.
5 Components of one’s psychology are
dispositional states in that they manifest themselves
as tendencies to believe, remember, opine, etc., in
certain ways. To hold a given belief, for example, is a
dispositional state — it consists in being disposed to
act a certain way in response to certain stimuli. If I
believe it is wrong to litter, this belief manifests itself as
a disposition to harangue those who litter (and probably
refrain from littering myself ).
6 The amount of time over which diachronic
phenomenal connectedness can obtain is very short,
lasting perhaps about one second (Dainton and Bayne
554).
7 Reid takes issue with Locke’s notion that “as far
as [one’s] consciousness can be extended backwards to
any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity
of that person” (Locke 241). Reid points out that
this doctrine implies a contradiction. Assume some
person, A, currently remembers the time when he/she
performed a certain action, B; furthermore, at the time
when he/she did B, he/she remembered performing an
even earlier action, C, but now A’s memory of C is lost.
Logically (if identity is a transitive relation), A should
Published by STARS, 2007

be the same as the one who did C, but Locke would
have to hold that this is not so, since A’s consciousness
does not currently extend so far backward.
8 But not one’s “self ” — I will develop this
particular point below.
9 To avoid confusion: Neither Dainton and
Bayne nor I hold that phenomenal continuity can be
maintained over periods of unconsciousness such as
dreamless sleep, anesthesia, etc. They acknowledge that
this creates a problem for their theory (do we die every
time we fall asleep?); they label it the “bridge problem”
and offer some solutions at the end of their piece (562).
10 I do not mean to imply that the degree of my
concern corresponds with the degree of my moral
indignation. I would submit that one can feel an
equal amount of moral indignation given two distinct
situations and nevertheless be more concerned about one
than the other, insofar as one commands more attention
than the other (for example, by being torture that
happens to me).
11 To clarify, when I say “the first clause of the
Inseparability Thesis” I mean its first
grammatical clause.
12 It might be objected that in certain situations
where a human being is unconscious (severing
phenomenal continuity), it is often the case that
the constituents of the self are preserved (in the
configuration of the brain) until the human being
wakes up. This preservation of one’s psychological
elements through periods of unconsciousness could
be taken to demonstrate that my amended reading
of the Inseparability Thesis is false, that phenomenal
continuity and self are in fact separable. My only
disagreement with this objection to my interpretation of
the amended Inseparability Thesis would be somewhat
pettily terminological. It is true that the self could be
said to lie dormant during periods of unconsciousness,
like dreamless sleep, and then make itself available
to the person immediately upon waking. However,
it is still the case that at any given moment in which
unconsciousness obtains, the self is not available to any
conscious subject. Since I define the self in terms of such
availability, it seems inappropriate to say that there is a
self during periods in which unconsciousness obtains.
(Such a statement would amount to saying that the
constituents of the self are available to consciousness
during unconsciousness.) Instead, it would be more clear
to describe a situation of dreamless sleep as one in which
the physical system responsible for rendering the self
retains its functionality, although the self is not present
because there is no person to which it can be made
available.
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13 The

alternatives (that it is survivable by both person
and self, or by self alone) are disallowed since they are
not consistent with the way I defined my terms.
14

In my terms, perhaps I ought to say that
downplaying psychological continuity in favor of
phenomenal continuity is obligatory when considering
the question of “person-self persistence” — not just
personal persistence — in order to capture a whole
individual in the language I use (as opposed to just his/
her person).
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